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RAISING THE STANDARD FOR EXPERT 
TESTIMONY: AN UNWARRANTED 
OBSTACLE IN PROVING CLAIMS OF CHILD 
SEXUAL ABUSE IN DEPENDENCY 
HEARINGS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the past 10 years, there has been a dramatic increase in 
awareness of the problem of child sexual abuse, 1 which has led 
to an increase in the number of reported cases.2 The investiga-
tions of these reported cases frequently indicate that legal inter-
vention is necessary to protect the physical and emotional health 
of the child at risk. Child advocates have found themselves en-
meshed in an evidentiary quagmire regarding the admissibility 
of testimony of expert witnesses who offer their opinions of 
whether or not the alleged abuse actually occurred. 
How the courts would choose to characterize this testi-
mony-that is, whether it constituted "expert opinion" or "sci-
entific evidence"-would ultimately determine its admissibility. 
And, given the difficulties inherent in proving claims of child 
sexual abuse,S any characterization which would preclude or sig-
1. Sexual abuse includes both sexual assault and sexual exploitation of minors. The 
abuse can involve many incidents over a long period of time or a single act. Sexual as· 
sault includes: rape, incest, sodomy, lewd or lascivious acts, oral copulation, and penetra-
tion of a genital or anal opening by a foreign object. J. VAN DE KAMP, CHILD ABUSE PRE-
VENTION HANDBOOK 9 (1985). 
2. ASSEMBLY OFFICE OF RESEARCH, SEXUAL ABUSE: A LIFELONG LEGACY (1986). "The 
Department of Justice reports that 23,663 cases of sexual abuse were investigated in 
1985, more than twice as many as in 1982." [d. at 2. Researchers do not believe that 
there has been a significant increase in the incidence of child sexual abuse. D. EDWARDS, 
BREAKING THE CYCLE, ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 3-4 
(1986). Rather it is believed that heightened awareness has led to an increase in the 
number of cases reported to authorities who investigate such reports. [d. See also S. 
FORWARD & C. BUCK, BETRAYAL OF INNOCENCE, INCEST AND ITS DEVASTATION 3 (1978). The 
increase is due in part to California law which requires that professionals working with 
children who either know or have reason to suspect that a child is a victim of abuse must 
report this information. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166(a) (West Supp. 1988). 
3. J. VAN DE KAMP, supra note 1, at 55. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL 
LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER FOR CHILD ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 
443 
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nificantly hamper admissibility would also drastically impede 
the goals of legal intervention. 
The issue of how to characterize the testimony of experts 
was addressed by the court in In Re Amber B.' and its exten-
sion, In Re Christine C.r, The county alleged that the father had 
sexually abused three-year old Amber and that her sister, one-
year old Teela, was at risk. At a dependency hearing, the court 
granted the county's petition to have the child declared a depen-
dent of the court. The primary evidence was offered by a court-
appointed psychologist who provided expert testimony that Am-
ber had been sexually abused.6 The opinion of the psychologist 
was based on the nature of Amber's disclosure of abuse, the 
ways in which she described the instances of abuse, and observa-
tions of Amber with anatomical dolls. 
In an earlier case, this type of testimony had been admissi-
ble as expert opinion to determine whether or not the child had 
been sexually abused.7 However, the appellate court in Amber B. 
held that the evidence was scientific evidence and not admissible 
as expert opinion.s As scientific evidence, the proponent of the 
evidence must establish that the scientific process has been gen-
erally accepted as reliable within the scientific community from 
which it was developed.9 As expert opinion, the evidence only 
has to be of the type that experts would reasonably rely upon in 
forming such an opinion.1o The Amber court raised the standard 
AND THE LAW 166 (1982) (general resource guide on legal issues encountered in child 
sexual abuse cases). 
4. 191 Cal. App. 3d 682, 236 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1987), rev. denied (July 30, 1987). 
5. 191 Cal. App. 3d. 676, 236 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1987), rev. denied (July 30, 1987). The 
decision in Christine C. was based on the court's holding in Amber B. and, therefore, this 
note will concentrate on the court's holding and reasoning in Amber B. and the impact it 
will have on dependency hearings in California. 
6. The court-appointed psychologist based his opinion on: three one-hour sessions 
with Amber, during which Amber "stuck her fingers 'vigorously' inside the doll's vagina 
and anus, and twisted her fingers back and forth ... ;" an interview of Amber's mother; a 
review of the police report; the dependency petition and the assessment report. Brief for 
Respondent at 4, Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d 682, 236 Cal. Rptr. 623. 
7. In re Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 200 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1984). 
8. Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d. at 691, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 629. 
9. [d. at 686, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 625-26. This standard of general acceptance is known 
as the Kelly-Frye test. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 30-31, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244, 130 
Cal. Rptr. 144, 148 (1976); Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
10. CAL. EVID. CODE § 801(b) (West 1966); see infra notes 59-60 and accompanying 
text (discussion of statute stating requirements for expert witnesses). 
2
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1988], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol18/iss2/7
1988] EVIDENCE 445 
of admissibility, increasing the already difficult task of proving 
claims of child sexual abuse. 
Evidentiary problems are aggravated by the nature of child 
sexual abuse. The perpetrator is often a family member;l1 often 
there is no physical evidence;12 and the child may be too younglS 
or traumatized to testify. a As a result, mental health profession-
als have come to play an increasingly important role as expert 
witnesses in these cases. 111 In detecting and validating claims of 
child sexual abuse, mental health professionals often observe the 
child with anatomical dolls and analyze any reports of abuse 
that the child makes.16 They utilize this information in their 
testimony. 
This comment will examine the Amber B. court's decision to 
characterize this evidence provided by the mental health profes-
sionals as scientific evidence and not as expert opinion. Sec-
ondly, this comment will explore the desirability of imposing the 
scientific evidence standard, usually applied in criminal cases, to 
dependency hearings. Finally, this comment will discuss the im-
plications of the Amber B. decision in light of the already pre-
sent evidentiary difficulties of proving child sexual abuse claims 
and the social policy of protecting the welfare of the abused 
child. 
II. ROLE OF MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS IN 
PROVING CLAIMS OF CHILD SEXUL ABUSE 
Each case of suspected child sexual abuse which is reported 
must be investigated by local law enforcement agencies or by 
11. D. EDWARDS, supra note 2, at 96 "[R]esearch has indicated that up to 50% of all 
reported cases of child sexual abuse involve sexual activity between family 
members .... " 
12. THE SEXUAL VICTIMOLOGY OF YOUTH (L. Schultz ed. 1980) [hereinafter Schultz] 
"[N]o more than 5 to 10 percent of sexual abuse involves physical injury .... " Id. at 40. 
13. See infra notes 24-27 and accompanying text (discussion of competence of 
young children as witnesses). 
14. Yates, Should Young Children Testify in Cases of Sexual Abuse?, 144 AM. J. OF 
PSYCHIATRY 476, 478 (1987) (trauma to the child witness may be the result of guilt over 
the harm the testimony does to a family member, guilt of having participated in a crime, 
fear of being jailed or otherwise punished and the horror of reliving the events). 
15. See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. 
16. An anatomical doll set typically includes adult male and female dolls and boy 
and girl dolls, with genitalia including penetrable body orifices such as the mouth, vagina 
and anus. 
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county child protective service agencies.17 Because of the in-
crease in the number of abuse cases reported, the task of vali-
dating claims of child sexual abuse is frequently delegated to 
mental health professionals.18 
The information obtained by mental health professionals is 
then used in the legal proceedings which follow. If it is deter-
mined that the child is in danger of further abuse in the family 
setting,19 civil proceedings20 can be brought to have the child de-
clared a dependent of the court under section 300 of the Califor-
nia Welfare and Institutions Code.21 Once the child has been de-
clared a dependent of the court, the court has a range of options 
17. J. VAN DE KAMP, supra note I, at 2. 
18. San Jose Mercury News, May 18, 1987, at 12A, col. 1. Mental health profession-
als, as used in this comment refer to psychiatrists, psychologists, licensed clinical social 
workers and licensed marriage, family, and child counselors. 
19. Distinction should be made between incest (sexual activity between persons who 
are blood-related) and intrafamilial contact (sexual activity between family members not 
related by blood). Rape is considered forced oral, anal or vaginal penetration, usually by 
an unknown perpetrator. J. VAN DE KAMP, supra note I, at 11. 
20. Petition is usually filed by the county child welfare department, and in some 
counties by the probation department. The probation officer or social worker filing the 
claim is often appointed guardian ad litem to represent the interests of the child. [d. at 
46. 
21. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West Supp. 1987) (operative until Jan. 1, 1989), 
which applied in Amber B., provided that minors under the following descriptions could 
be declared dependents of the court: 
(d) Whose home is an unfit place for him or her by reason of 
neglect, cruelty, depravity, or physical abuse of either of his or 
her parents, or of his or her guardian or other person in whose 
custody or care he or she is. 
(e) Who is under the age of three and whose home is an unfit 
place for him or her as a result of severe physical abuse of the 
minor by a parent, or by any person known by the par-
ent. . . . For the purpose of this section, "severe physical 
abuse" means any of the following ... any single act of sexual 
abuse which causes significant bleeding, deep bruising, or sig-
nificant external or internal swelling. . . . 
Section 300 (operative Jan. 1, 1989) and section 300 (operative Jan. 1, 1990) include a 
statement of Legislative intent to provide maximum protection for children who are sex-
ually abused and specifically incorporates into the description of minors who may be 
declared dependents of the court: 
(d) The minor has been sexually abused, or there is a substan-
tial risk that the minor will be sexually abused, as defined in 
subdivision (b) of Section 11165 of the Penal Code ... or the 
parent or guardian has failed to adequately protect the minor 
f~om sexual abuse when the parent or guardian knew or rea-
sonably should have known that the minor was in danger of 
sexual abuse. 
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to protect the child: from removing the child from the home to 
leaving the child in the parents' care under court supervision.22 
In addition to civil proceedings, the information obtained may 
be used if criminal charges are brought against an alleged 
perpetrator.28 
There are many difficulties encountered in proving claims of 
child sexual abuse. The child victim is frequently the only wit-
ness to the abuse.24 As a witness, the competency of the child is 
often a major issue, although California courts have given liberal 
interpretation to Evidence Code section 701, which governs the 
competency of witnesses.211 Generally the child is only disquali-
fied as incompetent if he or she is incapable of expressing him-
self or herself or incapable of understanding the duty of the wit-
ness to tell the truth.28 Even if the child is competent, his or her 
credibility as a witness is still suspect, especially if the child is 
very young.27 
22. The dependency hearing involve two stages. At the jurisdictional stage, the court 
determines by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the child comes within one of 
the categories of § 300. The second stage is the the dispositional phase and requires clear 
and convincing evidence to remove the child from the custody of the parent. In re Cheryl 
H., 153 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 1112, 200 Cal. Rptr. 789, 797 (1984). Short of removing the 
child from the parent, the court can order the dependent child to remain at home under 
the supervision of the child welfare services or probation department. J. VAN DE KAMP, 
supra note 1, at 46; see also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361 (West Supp. 1988) (removal 
of child from home) and CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 360(a) (West Supp. 1988) (super-
vised custody). 
23. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166(g) (West Supp. 1988) requires cross reports from the 
child protection agency to the district attorney. See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.1 
(West Supp. 1988) which defines sexual abuse as sexual assault (rape, incest, sodomy, 
lewd or lascivious acts, oral copulation, penetration of a genital or anal opening by a 
foreign object, intentional touching of the child's genitals or clothing covering them, and 
masturbation in the presence of a child) and sexual exploitation (child pornography and 
prostitution). 
24. J. HERMAN, FATHER-DAUGHTER INCEST 164-65 (1981). 
25. CAL. EVID. CODE § 701(a) (West Supp. 1988) states: 
26.Id. 
A person is disqualified to be a witness if he or she is: (1) Inca-
pable of expressing himself or herself concerning the matter so 
as to be understood, either directly or through interpretation 
by one who can understand him; or (2) Incapable of under-
standing the duty of a witness to tell the truth. 
27. See Myers, The Child Witness: Techniques for Direct Examination, Cross Ex-
amination and Impeachment, 18 PAC. L.J. 801 (1987) (comprehensive article on children 
witnesses with specific techniques for supporting and attacking their credibility, includ-
ing a section on cross examining a child who has testified using anatomical dolls); YATES, 
supra note 14, at 478 (author states that it is not known whether the child can distin-
guish his or her own thoughts about another person's actions from that person's real 
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In addition, the experience of testifying can be very trau-
matic for the child.28 In cases of intrafamilial sexual abuse, the 
incidents of abuse are likely to be shrouded in secrecy and in-
volve a family member.29 Recent legislation has been enacted in 
an attempt to protect the child witness.30 But even with these 
legislative protections, the testimony of the child is often inade-
quate in proving that the abuse occurred. Furthermore, because 
there is often a substantial time lag between the incidence of 
abuse and disclosure, there is seldom sufficient physical evidence 
to support the claim of sexual abuse.31 
The lack of direct evidence and the absence of corroborating 
physical evidence makes the role played by the mental health 
professional crucial in validating claims of child sexual abuse. 
This is especially true when the child is very young and unable 
to testify.32 In factual situations like Amber B., the testimony of 
the expert may be the only significant evidence available.33 Even 
when the child is able to testify, testimony by the expert has 
been useful to validate and give credibility to the child's testi-
mony, as well as to dispel any misconceptions and myths the 
court and jury might have about child sexual abuse.34 
actions, particularly when an oedipal-age child attributes sexual iritent to a parent). 
28. See supra note 14. See also Tedesco & Schnell, Children's Reactions to Sex 
Abuse Investigations and Litigation, 11 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 267, 271 (children 
required to testify in court viewed process as harmful). 
29. D. EDWARDS, supra note 2, at 12, 91 (between 75-85% of child abusers are known 
to their victims prior to the first incidence of abuse). 
30. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 861.5 (postponement of preliminary hearing to accom-
modate child witness); § 868.5 (family member may accompany child to the witness 
stand); § 868.6 (nonthreatening environment for minor witness); § 868.8 (special precau-
tions for child molestation victims) (West Supp. 1988). 
31. See SHULTZ, supra note 12, at 40. 
32. "Toddlers and school-age children have difficulty verbalizing fears and concerns. 
They are likely, however, to present physical and behavioral signs and symptoms." Id. at 
47. 
33. In re Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d 682, 691-92, 236 Cal. Rptr. 623, 629-30 (1987). 
34. Expert testimony has been admitted regarding Child Sexual Abuse Accommoda-
tion Syndrome [hereinafter CSAASj. The syndrome describes the supposed typical be-
havior of sexually abused children involving one or more of five elements: secrecy, help-
lessness, entrapment and accommodation, delayed disclosure and retraction. Summit, 
The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 177 
(1983). See People v. Gray, 187 Cal. App. 3d 213, 231 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1986) (expert testi-
mony regarding CSAAS delayed reporting admissible, and Kelly-Frye not applied, as 
long as purpose was not to prove that abuse had in fact occurred, but to rehabilitate 
claimant's credibility and to educate the jury about widely held misconceptions about 
child sexual abuse); People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1985) 
(court permitted testimony based on CSAAS to rehabilitate the victim's credibility and 
6
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Anatomical dolls are recently developed tools which assist 
mental health professionals in validating claims of child sexual 
abuse.3~ The dolls are used as a means of aiding children in ac-
curately relating their sexual knowledge and experience.36 The 
premise behind the use of these dolls is that the child will use 
them in making a spontaneous disclosure of an abuse experience 
with minimal direction and encouragement.37 The dolls are par-
ticularly useful with very young children who lack verbal skills 
to relate their sexual knowledge and experiences.38 
The use of anatomical dolls in proving claims of child sexual 
abuse was examined by the court in Amber B. The court held 
that the testimony of mental health professionals based on their 
observation of the child with the anatomical dolls and their 
analysis of the child's reporting of abuse was not merely evi-
dence offered as expert opinion.39 Instead, the court found their 
observations and analyses to be the result of scientific processes, 
and therefore, required stricter scrutiny before being admitted 
as evidence. '0 
III. APPLYING THE KELLY-FRYE TEST IN CHILD SEX-
UAL ABUSE CASES 
On appeal, the primary issue in Amber B. was whether the 
did not apply Kelly-Frye); In re Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 200 Cal. Rptr. 789 
(1984) (although specific evidence based on CSAAS was not offered, expert was permit· 
ted to testify generally on symptoms of sexually abused children); People v. Dunnahoo, 
152 Cal. App. 3d 561, 199 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1984) (experts permitted to testify to bolster 
victims' credibility). But see cases cited infra note 90 (testimony based on CSAAS inad-
missible when offered for purposes other than to rehabilitate the credibility of the 
victim). 
35. Anatomical dolls were originally created in 1976 by Marsha Morgan and Virginia 
Friedemann. Telephone interview with Marsha Morgan (October 30, 1987); see B. BOAT 
& M. EVERSON, USING ANATOMICAL DOLLS: GUIDELINES FOR INTERVIEWING YOUNG CHIL-
DREN IN SEXUAL ABUSE INVESTIGATIONS (1986) (training manual for the use of anatomical 
dolls); V. FRIEDEMANN, INTERVIEWING SEXUAL ABUSE VICTIMS USING ANATOMICAL DOLLS: 
THE PROFESSIONAL GUIDEBOOK (1983) (training manual for the use of anatomical dolls); 
CHILD GUIDANCE CENTER, YOUNG SEXUAL ABUSE VICTIMS: AN INTERVIEW PROTOCOL (1986) 
(video and guidebook training for interviewing children with anatomical dolls, available 
by contacting P.O. Box 45145, Cleveland, OH 44145). 
36. B. BOAT & M. EVERSON, supra note 35, at 3. 
37. The methods used in employing anatomical dolls vary, but generally include sev-
eral sessions with the child in which the professional builds rapport with the child, as-
sesses the child's understanding and observes the child at play with the dolls. [d. at 3. 
38. [d. at 1. 
39. In re Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d. 682, 691, 236 Cal. Rptr. 623, 629 (1987). 
40. [d. 
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techniques employed by the psychologist in detecting child sex-
ual abuse were admissible as expert testimony or were new sci-
entific methods of proof which would have to satisfy the Kelly-
Frye test of admissibility.·l The Kelly-Frye rule as stated by the 
Amber B. court requires that "evidence based on a new scientific 
method of proof is admissible only upon a showing that the pro-
cedure has been generally accepted as reliable in the scientific 
community in which it was developed.""2 In addition to showing 
that the process has been generally accepted, proponents must 
also show that the process was conducted using the correct sci-
entific procedures and that the person administering the test 
was properly qualified.·8 
The Kelly-Frye test focuses on the reliability of the method 
in the community in which it was developed. The reliability is 
established by a showing of general acceptance in the commu-
nity." General acceptance of the method can be demonstrated 
by the amount of research conducted in the field, the scientific 
literature on the subject and the existence of cases in which tes-
timony based on the new theory has been admitted."!! The bur-
den of establishing the reliability of the method and the proper 
qualifications of the witness rests on the party offering the evi-
41. See cases cited supra note 9. 
42. Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d at 686, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 625-26. 
43. See People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 30, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 
148 (1976) (court held scientific evidence must meet three part test: 1) method generally 
accepted as reliable, 2) expert witness properly qualified, and 3) correct procedure used 
by expert witness); see also People v. Dellinger, 163 Cal. App. 3d 284, 293-95, 209 Cal. 
Rptr. 503, 508-09 (1984) (admission of evidence relating to anthropomorthic dummy in a 
criminal case to prove the child did not sustain fatal injuries from falling down stairs 
held to be prejudicial error because it failed to meet the three-prong Kelly-Frye test); 
see generally WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, §§ 864-900 (3d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1987). 
44. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d at 30, 549 P.2d at 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 148 (the court's task 
is not to determine accuracy of the proffered scientific technique but to show a scientific 
consensus supporting the use). 
45. People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 530, 726 P. 2d 516, 523, 230 Cal. Rptr. 834, 841 
(1985) (court may look beyond the trial record and examine California precedent, cases 
from other jurisdictions and scientific literature to determine whether the evidence 
meets the Kelly-Frye test); People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 56, 641 P.2d 775, 797, 181 
Cal. Rptr. 243, 267 (1982) (in meeting the Kelly-Frye test, scientists are permitted to 
speak to the court through published writing such as treatises and journals as evidence 
of a technique'S general acceptance as reliable); see also United States v. Brown, 557 
F.2d 541, 555 (1977) (amount of research conducted in field); United States v. Baller, 519 
F.2d 463, 465-66 (1975) (number of cases that admitted testimony based on new theory); 
United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 441 (1970) (number of articles written on the 
subject). 
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dence.48 A single expert witness would not be sufficient to re-
present the views of the scientific community regarding 
reliability.47 
If evidence based on the use of anatomical dolls is offered as 
the product of a scientific process, it is doubtful that such evi-
dence will pass the Kelly-Frye test. Although the use of such 
dolls is already widespread within the mental health commu-
nity,48 their use is relatively new. There are not, as yet, stan-
dardized guidelines by which to use anatomical dolls, nor is 
there definitive data regarding the interpretation of the informa-
tion obtained from a child's interaction with the dolls.49 Another 
problem in meeting the Kelly-Frye test as a scientific process 
exists in determining who would be qualified to administer the 
process. There is no consensus among mental health profession-
als as to the level of training and professional education which 
should be required of someone utilizing anatomical dolls.1IO The 
dolls have been used by a range of professionals, such as police 
officers, nurses, social workers, psychologists and psychiatrists. 
Many are not properly trained in the use of the dolls:u Although 
there are several training manuals that provide guidelines for 
the use of anatomical dolls, there is no generally accepted scien-
46. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 36-40, 549 P.2d 1240, 1248-50, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 
152-54 (1976); see also Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 54, 641 P.2d at 796, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 265; 
People v. Roehler, 167 Cal. App. 3d 353, 213 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1985). 
47. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d at 37, 549 P.2d at 1248, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 152. To ensure impar-
tiality, the proponent of the evidence should use different experts to establish that the 
scientific method is generally accepted than those experts that are used to testify regard-
ing the application of the technique in that particular case. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d at 533, 726 
P. 2d at 525, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 843 (credentialed forensic technicians who offered evi-
dence regarding genetic analyses of dried fluid and stain samples from victim's body in 
rape case were not qualified to give the view of relevant community of impartial scien-
tists because of their affiliation with law enforcement officials in the case). 
48. B. BOAT & M. EVERSON, supra note 35, at 1. 
49. [d. at 29. See Jampole and Weber, An Assessment of Behavior of Sexually 
Abused Children with Anatomically Correct Dolls, 11 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 187-88 
(1987) (article notes common use of anatomical dolls but cautions the need to cross-
check any interpretation of a child's behavior with the dolls with other observational 
data since empirical research regarding anatomical dolls is new and limited). 
50. B. BOAT & M. EVERSON, supra note 35 at 29. 
51. "It is therefore imperative that individuals using anatomical dolls in child sexual 
abuse investigations obtain adequate training." [d. at 3; see Pinkney v. Clay County, 635 
F. Supp. 1079 (D. Minn. 1986) (in a civil rights action arising from investigation and 
prosecution of child sexual abuse claims, court found law enforcement officials not prop-
erly trained with anatomical dolls to offer expert testimony based on their observations). 
9
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tific procedure to be followed. 1I2 Furthermore, many experts in 
the field do not view the dolls as a scientific process, but instead, 
as tools utilized by the clinician to facilitate a better under-
standing of their child clients. liS 
The inadmissibility of this evidence will have a significant 
impact on the ability to place young children, who cannot tes-
tify, under the protection of the court. In both Amber B. and 
Christine C., the admission of testimony by the expert was con-
sidered by the court to be erroneous because the expert utilized 
anatomical dolls in forming his opinion. This error was found to 
be harmless in Christine C. because the children testified and 
their testimony was believable.1I4 In Amber B., the error was not 
harmless. Three-year old Amber was unable to testify and there 
was no other significant evidence besides the testimony of the 
psychologist.1I11 On remand, the district attorney dismissed the 
dependency petition and Amber and her sister were returned to 
the sole custody of their parents. liS Prior to Amber B., the courts 
allowed this evidence as expert opinion. Why did the court find 
it necessary to redefine this evidence as the product of a scien-
tific process and, as a result, categorically exclude this important 
evidence? 
IV. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN EXPERT OPINION 
AND SCIENTIFIC PROCESS 
Prior to Amber B., expert opinion that a child had been sex-
ually abused was admitted, following the court's holding in In 
re Cheryl H.1I7 Cheryl H. was a dependency hearing in which a 
psychiatrist offered her opinion that the child had been abused. 
The court found that the psychiatrist's education, knowledge 
and experience qualified her to draw inferences about whether 
or not the child had been sexually abused. liB This expertise, be-
52. See B. BOAT & M. EVERSON, supra note 35, at 29. 
53. Telephone interview with Barbara Boat, Ph.D. (October 30, 1987); see B. BOAT 
& M. EVERSON, supra note 35, at 29. 
54. In re Christine C., 191 Cal. App. 3d 676, 680, 236 Cal. Rptr. 630, 632 (1987). 
55. In re Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d 682, 691, 236 Cal. Rptr. 623, 629 (1987). 
56. Telephone interview with Thomas H. Gordinier, Attorney for Plaintiff and Re-
spondent in Amber B. (Aug. 27, 1987). 
57. 153 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 200 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1984). 
58. The court limited the testimony to the issue of whether or not the child had 
been abused and not whether a particular individual had committed the acts. [d. at 1116, 
200 Cal. Rptr. at 799-800. The court excluded the opinion of the psychiatrist that the 
10
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ing beyond common experience that would assist the trier of 
fact, allowed the witness to offer her opinion as an expert under 
the Evidence Code section 801.119 Section 801(b) requires that 
the expert opinion be: 
[b]ased on matter (including his special knowl-
edge, skill, experience, training and education) 
perceived by or personally known to the witness 
or made known to him at or before the hearing, 
whether or not admissible, that is of a type that 
reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in 
forming an opinion upon the subject to which his 
testimony relates .... 60 
The psychiatrist in Cheryl H. based her opinion on: 1) ob-
serving the child with anatomical dolls, 2) the manner in which 
the child disclosed the abuse by using new slang terms for geni-
talia' and 3) observing behavior which demonstrated anxiety 
symptoms characteristic of sexually abused children.6 } The court 
found that the data used by the expert witness was proper mat-
ter on which to base such an opinion.62 By allowing the testi-
father had committed the abuse because it was considered to be an impermissible infer-
ence about the conduct of a third party based on hearsay. [d. See In re Christina T., 184 
Cal. App. 3d 630, 640, 229 Cal. Rptr. 247, 253 (1986) (court held that although the iden-
tity of the perpetrator was relevant to the placement of the child, it was not relevant to 
whether the court should invoke jurisdiction to protect the child, and, therefore, the 
court could declare the child a dependent of the court without identifying the 
perpetrator). 
59. CAL. EVID. CODE § 801(a) (West 1966). 
60. CAL. EVID. CODE § 801(b) (West 1966); see Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d at 1118, 
200 Cal. Rptr. at 801 (It is not enough that an inference be beyond common experience; 
the expert opinion must assist the trier of fact.) 
61. Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d at 1116-18, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 800-01; see supra note 
34 for discussion of CSAAS. 
62. The court found that the expert's testimony regarding Cheryl's statements and 
conduct with the anatomical dolls was not hearsay, because her statements were not 
offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but as the basis for the expert's opinion. 
Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d at 1118, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 801. The court also held that most 
of the conduct and statements on which the expert opinions were based were indepen-
dently admissible. The conduct by the child was considered to be nonassertive and, 
therefore, not hearsay. The evidence concerning the anatomical dolls was relevant to 
infer that the child had been exposed to inappropriate sexual conduct. [d. at 1126, 200 
Cal. Rptr. at 807. Other jurisdictions have dealt with the hearsay issue of admitting ex-
pert testimony of the child's reports of sexual abuse and have admitted testimony of the 
child's conduct and statements while using the anatomical dolls without applying the 
Kelly-Frye test. See In re C. L., 397 N.W.2d 81 (S.D. 1986) (court held that the sponta-
neous reaction of a six-year old to anatomical dolls and maneuvering of the dolls to 
11
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mony under section 801 as expert opinion, the Cheryl H. court 
used a standard of admissibility that required that the manner 
utilized in basing the opinion be of a type that may be reasona-
bly relied upon in forming such an opinion. The Amber B. court 
modified the Cheryl H. holding by labeling the basis of such 
opinions as scientific processes requiring Kelly-Frye.63 This 
characterization replaced the reasonable reliance standard with 
a much stricter standard of general acceptance in the scientific 
community. 
The Amber B. court decided that the Cheryl H. holding had 
to be reconsidered primarily because of the subsequent criminal 
case, People v. Bledsoe.6" In Bledsoe, the court applied the 
Kelly-Frye test to evidence of Rape Trauma Syndrome.6~ The 
Amber B. court found Bledsoe to be analogous because both 
cases involved expert testimony based on psychological analysis 
of behavior.66 The Bledsoe court did not provide any analysis of 
why Rape Trauma Syndrome was considered a scientific process 
but simply relied on People v. Shirley.67 In Shirley, testimony 
based on the use of hypnotically aided recall was subjected to 
perform sexual acts was not hearsay but relevant and admissible evidence); In re M.E., 
715 S.W.2d 572 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (court held that testimony of Family Services staff 
regarding observations of children with anatomical dolls was not hearsay, but admissible 
to show unusually superim sexual knowledge to infer some sort of sexual abuse had oc-
curred but not necessarily to identify perpetrator); In re Penelope B., 104 Wash. 2d 643, 
709 P. 2d 1185 (1985) (court held that testimony of therapists as to their observation of 
the child's conduct and demeanor during play with anatomical dolls was admissible as 
nonassertive conduct and not hearsay and therefore appropriate for inclusion in hypo-
thetical question given to psychiatric expert); D.A.H. v. G.A.H., 371 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1985) (court held that psychologist's testimony of child's statement made in a ses-
sion using anatomical dolls and psychologist's testimony based on an abuse counselor's 
report were admissible under the "catch-all" exception to hearsay rule because of the 
guarantee of reliability and trustworthiness of the testimony). 
63. In re Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d. 682, 691, 236 Cal. Rptr. 623, 629 (1987). 
64. People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984) (in a 
criminal case where the defendant was convicted of forcibly raping a 14-year-old girl, 
court held that evidence offered by the prosecution regarding Rape Trauma Syndrome 
was erroneously admitted). 
65. Evidence of Rape Trauma Syndrome-a spectrum of physical, psychological and 
emotional reactions of rape victims was offered by the prosecution to prove a rape oc-
curred. [d. at 247-48, 681 P.2d at 298-99, 203 Cal. Rptr at 457-58. The court applied the 
Kelly-Frye standard and then concluded that Rape Trauma Syndrome failed the test 
because it was not generally accepted as a means of determining whether a rape oc-
curred, but as a therapeutic tool to assist counselors. [d. at 249-50, 681 P.2d at 300, 203 
Cal. Rptr at 459. 
66. Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d at 687-88, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 627. 
67. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982). 
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the Kelly-Frye test.6S 
Shirley and Bledsoe did not define scientific process; nor 
did these cases set forth guidelines for determining when Kelly-
Frye would apply to psychological evidence.69 While the Amber 
B. court found Shirley and Bledsoe to be persuasive, it admitted 
that the answer to the question of whether the psychologist sim-
ply provided expert testimony or utilized a scientific process was 
"elusive."70 The court stated that there was little guidance for 
determining at what point evidence transcends expert testimony 
and becomes scientific proof.71 The court further noted that the 
task is particularly difficult when it involves psychological analy-
sis of behavior.72 The court rejected the idea that the determina-
tion should be made upon factors pertaining to the nature of the 
challenged procedure.7s Instead, the court decided that the un-
derlying purpose behind Kelly-Frye should determine whether 
the test is required or not." The court quoted People v. McDon-
ald in stating that the underlying purpose was to prevent the 
factfinder "from being misled by the 'aura of infallibility' that 
may surround unproven scientific methods.1I711 As a result, the 
Amber B. court held that the Kelly-Frye test applied to psycho-
logical evidence whenever the factfinder would tend to ascribe 
an inordinately high degree of certainty to the evidence.76 
In McDonald, however, the court did not take such a broad 
approach in applying Kelly-Frye, but instead recognized the im-
portance of distinguishing between expert testimony and scien-
tific evidence." In addressing the issue of whether Kelly-Frye 
68. [d. at 53, 641 P.2d at 795, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 264. The court stated without elabo-
ration, "[w)e do not doubt that if testimony based on a new scientific process operating 
on purely psychological evidence were to be offered in our courts, it would likewise be 
subjected to the Frye standard of admissibility." [d. Evidence based on hypnotically 
aided recall did not meet the test because of what the court considered to be a lack of 
consensus within scientific literature on the subject. [d. 
69. Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d at 688, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 627. 
70. [d. at 690, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 628. 
71. [d. 
72. [d. 
73. [d. 
74. [d. 
75. [d., 236 Cal. Rptr. at 629 (quoting People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 372, 690 
P.2d 709, 723-24, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236, 250-51 (1984». 
76. Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d at 690-91, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 629. 
77. People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d at 372, 690 P.2d at 723-24, 208 Cal. Rptr. 250-
51. 
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should be applied to psychological evidence involving cross-ra-
cial identification in line-ups, the court stated that expert testi-
mony can be tempered by healthy skepticism, but that "the op-
posite may be true when the evidence is produced by a 
machine: ... apparently 'scientific' mechanism, instrument, or 
procedure."78 The court in McDonald was not persuaded that 
Kelly-Frye would apply.79 
The Amber B. court acknowledged that the Kelly-Frye test 
has been used primarily for "novel devices or processes involving 
the manipulation of physical evidence, such as lie detectors, ex-
perimental systems of blood typing, voiceprints, identification 
by human bite marks .... "80 The court noted that the few 
cases that did apply the test to psychological evidence gave little 
guidance for determining "at what point evidence based upon a 
. psychological analysis of behavior transcends expert testimony 
and becomes scientific evidence."81 But, the court side-stepped 
the issue by failing to determine what constitutes "scientific evi-
dence. "82 Instead of clarifying the distinctions between scientific 
processes and expert opinion, the court tended to blur them 
together. 
The court should have made a clear distinction between ex-
pert opinion and scientific process. The court decided not to 
take the direct approach of determining "the presence of a 'new 
scientific method of proof based upon factors pertaining to the 
nature of the challenged procedure .... "8S If the court had, it 
would have had a difficult time labeling the use of anatomical 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 373, 690 P.2d at 724, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 251. The court stated: 
We have never applied the Kelly-Frye rule to expert medical 
testimony, even when the witness is a psychiatrist and the 
subject matter is as esoteric as the reconstitution of a past 
state of mind or the prediction of future dangerousness, or 
even the diagnosis of an unusual form of mental illnes not 
listed in the diagnostic manual of the American Psychiatric 
Association. 
Id. See People v. Gray, 187 Cal. App. 3d 213, 231 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1986) (the court, follow-
ing McDonald, held that expert testimony regarding CSAAS did not need to meet Kelly-
Frye when offered to rehabilitate claimant's testimony). 
80. Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d at 686, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 625-26. 
81. Id. at 690, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 628. 
82. Id. at 691, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 629. 
83. Id. at 690, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 629. 
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dolls and analysis of the child's report of abuse as scientific 
processes requiring Kelly-Frye. By failing to determine whether 
a scientific process exists, but instead focusing on whether the 
factfinder would tend to ascribe an inordinately high degree of 
certainty to the evidence, the court creates a test that is ambigu-
ous and tends to beg the question. Expert testimony is tradition-
ally utilized because the subject matter is beyond the common 
experience of the factfinder. s4 The court does not indicate at 
what point, beyond that of common experience, the factfinder 
would tend to ascribe an inordinately high degree of certainty to 
the expert testimony. 
Experts' opinions based on observing children with anatom-
ical dolls cannot be considered a scientific process in the same 
manner as voiceprints or polygraphs. The dictionary defines the 
word "scientific" as "systematic or accurate in the manner of an 
exact science. "SI) The use of devices that physically manipulate 
pieces of data and give quantifiable results fall more clearly into 
this definition of scientific process. The use of anatomical dolls 
and the analysis of the child's reporting do not. The experts' 
opinions in these cases are based on their training, knowledge 
and general experience in working with children who have been 
sexually abused.s6 The dolls are not a standardized test which 
produce quantifiable results. They are the working tools of clini-
cians which provide relevant insight upon which experts can 
base their opinions.s7 As one manual for the use of anatomical 
84. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. 
85. RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1179 (rev. ed. 1975). Accord STEDMAN'S 
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 867 & 1140 (5th ed. 1982), which defines "method" as a mode or 
manner or orderly sequence of events of a process and defines "process" as a method 
used in attainment of a certain result. 
86. In re Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 1116, 200 Cal. Rptr. 789, 800 (1984) 
(psychiatrist's education, knowledge and experience made her familiar with the behavior 
typical of children who have been subjected to sexual abuse and allowed her to draw 
inferences that were beyond common experience; therefore, of assistance to the finder of 
fact). 
87. See also In re Rinesmith, 144 Mich. App. 475, 477, 376 N.W.2d 139, 141 (1985) 
(a Michigan court rejected the argument that expert testimony based on observations of 
the child with anatomical dolls must first meet the Frye standard to be admissible as a 
foundation for the expert's opinion that the child was sexually abused because the dolls 
were not calculated to elicit a particular result but as tools to permit children to commu-
nicate ideas which they are unable to express verbally); In re E.M., 520 N.Y.S.2d 327, 
332 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1987) (a New York court permitted expert testimony based on ana-
tomical dolls to corroborate child's out-of-court statements, but noted that empirical re-
search is new and limited, and therefore more weight should be given to the experts who 
15
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dolls states: 
Anatomical dolls are not magical. Using them in a 
sexual abuse investigation does not ensure dis-
closure nor provide a failsafe method of obtaining 
the truth. Instead, they are a highly valuable tool 
for facilitating a meaningful exchange with chil-
dren about their sexual knowledge and experi-
ence. . . . The effectiveness of any tool is contin-
gent upon the skill of the user.88 
In Amber B. the psychologist's opinion was also based upon 
Amber's disclosure of the abuse.89 It is likely that the expert 
based this opinion upon his knowledge of general theories of 
child development and his expertise in the assessment and treat-
ment of sexually abused children tailored to the unique situation 
of this particular child. But, the court characterized this testi-
mony, not as expert opinion, but as a scientific process requiring 
the Kelly-Frye standard of general acceptance.90 Mental health 
professionals might agree that a psychologist could reasonably 
rely on the nature of the reporting in forming an opinion that 
are professionally qualified in clinical disciplines and have had experience in diagnostic 
assessment of child sexual abuse victims). 
88. B. BOAT & M. EVERSON, supra note 35, at 3. See also Jampole & Weber supra 
note 49, at 192 (the study compared the behavior of sexually abused children and chil-
dren not sexually abused at play with anatomical dolls and concluded that "anatomical 
dolls are a useful instrument in child abuse investigations.") 
89. In re Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d 682, 685, 236 Cal. Rptr. 623, 625 (1987). 
90. [d. at 691, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 629. The Amber court distinguished the expert's 
analysis of the child's report of abuse from Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syn-
drome because the witness did not specifically mention the syndrome or its elements. 
But the court suggests that evidence based on the syndrome would also be considered a 
scientific process and therefore subject to Kelly-Frye. [d. at 690 n.3, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 
628 n.3. See also In re Sara M., 194 Cal. App. 3d 585, 239 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1987) (court 
held that expert testimony based on "child molest syndrome" must meet the Kelly-Frye 
test unless offered for the sole purpose of rehabilitating the victim's credibility and that 
the evidence failed to meet the test); Seering v. Department of Social Serv., 194 Cal. 
App. 3d 298, 239 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1987) (testimony of psychiatrist based on child sexual 
abuse accommodation syndrome inadmissible for failing to meet Kelly-Frye test); but 
see Myers, supra note 27, at 801 (author states that CSAAS is the proper subject for 
expert testimony that the child had been abused and to bolster credibility of the victim); 
Comment, Child Sexual Abuse in California: Legislative and Judicial Responses, 15 
GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 437 (1985) (overview of child sexual abuse legislation); Com-
ment, The Admissibility of "Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome" in Cali-
fornia Criminal Courts, 17 PAC. L.J. 1361 (1986) (advocates the admissibility of CSAAS 
in criminal cases and argues that CSAAS should be able to meet the Kelly-Frye test); 
see also cases cited supra note 34 (CSAAS admissible to rehabilitate credibility of 
victim). 
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the child had been sexually abused. But it is doubtful that they 
would agree that this particular psychologist's analysis of the 
child's reporting was generally acceptable as a reliable scientific 
process of diagnosing sexual abuse. 
A subsequent case, Seering v. Department of Social Ser-
vices,sl recognized the difference between an expert's personal 
opinion based on his or her own experience and an opinion that 
was based upon a scientific process.S2 The Seering court, in re-
jecting the Amber B. court's broad language, held that subject-
ing all expert testimony based upon analyses of the child's re-
ports of child sexual abuse to the Kelly-Frye test would severely 
limit the ability of experts to present their opinions.s3 The court 
reasoned that in most cases it would be impossible to show that 
the expert's own personal opinion would be generally accepted 
in the relevant scientific community.s4 
The Amber B. court labels such testimony as a scientific 
process based solely on the tendency of the factfinder to be awed 
by the evidence. The court's determination is done without ex-
amining the nature of the evidence and without even considering 
whether the community which developed the evidence considers 
it to be a scientific process. Once labeled as scientific process, 
the court will not admit the evidence unless it is shown that the 
community from which it was developed generally accepts it as a 
reliable scientific process. If that community does not in the first 
place consider the evidence to be a scientific process, the evi-
dence can never pass a test of being generally accepted as a reli-
able scientific method. Therefore, by the court's not considering 
the nature of the evidence but instead focusing on the probable 
effect it might have on influencing a factfinder, the court cate-
gorically excludes the evidence. If the court is going to look to 
the scientific community for reliability, it should also look to 
that community to determine initially whether the evidence can 
be defined as a scientific process. 
91. 194 Cal. App. 3d 298, 314, 239 Cal. Rptr. 422, 432 (1987). 
92. Although testimony of the psychiatrist's own opinion was admitted as expert 
opinion, the court adopted the Amber B. analysis in finding that testimony based on 
CSAAS must meet the Kelly-Frye test. [d. at 307, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 428. 
93. [d. at 314, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 432. 
94. [d. 
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The court would have been correct in excluding the evi-
dence based on the anatomical dolls and the analysis of the 
child's report if it had been offered as the result of a scientific 
process to prove that an abuse had occurred.911 But the evidence 
was not offered for that purpose. It was offered as an explana-
tion of how the expert utilized his knowledge, skill, training and 
experience in forming his opinion that the child had been sexu-
ally abused.D6 
The court was motivated to impose Kelly-Frye out of its 
concern that the factfinder would be unduly impressed by expert 
opinion based upon unreliable matters.97 But, concerns about 
the reliability and trustworthiness of experts' opinions were suf-
ficiently addressed by Cheryl H.98 and the application of Evi-
dence Code section 801(b).99 This statute, which models the 
Federal Rules of Evidence,loo requires that the matter relied 
upon by the expert in forming his or her opinion be of a type 
that reasonably may be relied upon by experts in forming an 
opinion upon the subject to which the testimony relates. lol As 
the Law Revision Commission comment following the statute 
states: "In a large measure, this assures the reliability and trust-
worthiness of the information used by experts in forming their 
opinion."102 The statute provides adequate safeguards without 
the additional requirements of Kelly-Frye. 
V. APPLYING KELLY-FRYE TO DEPENDENCY 
HEARINGS 
In addition to its failure to adequately define scientific pro-
cess, the Amber B. court applied Kelly-Frye to dependency 
hearings without fully considering the distinction between de-
pendency hearings and criminal trials. l03 In determining that the 
95. [d. 
96. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. 
97. In re Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d 682, 686, 236 Cal. Rptr. 623, 626 (1987). 
98. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
99. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text. 
100. FED. R. EVID. 703 ("If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the partic-
ular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not 
be admissible in evidence. ") 
101. CAL. EVID. CODE § 801(b) (West 1966). 
102. CAL. EVID. CODE § 801 Cal. Law Rev. Commission'8 comment (West 1966). 
103. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text and infra notes 113-14 and ac-
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holding in Cheryl H. needed to be reconsidered, the Amber B. 
court relied heavily upon Bledsoe and Shirley.104 Cheryl H., 
however, was a dependency hearing, while both Bledsoe and 
Shirley were criminal cases. 
In Bledsoe, .the court's main concern was whether the evi-
dence of Rape Trauma Syndrome was reliable in determining 
whether "a rape in a legal sense has, in fact, occurred."lOIi Al-
though Bledsoe did not specifically layout the reasons for ap-
plying the Kelly-Frye standard,106 its application and necessity 
for judicial restraint were generally in line with People v. 
Kelly.107 
The Kelly court applied the Frye general acceptance stan-
dard of admissibility to evidence based on voiceprints. In apply-
ing the standard, the court stated that the criticism of the Frye 
standard was that the test was "too conservative, often resulting 
in the prevention of the admission of relevant evidence. "108 The 
Kelly court found the conservative nature of the test to be its 
primary advantage in criminal cases and that the "[e]xercise of 
restraint is especially warranted when the identification tech-
nique is offered to identify the perpetrator of a crime."109 
Following Bledsoe, several criminal cases did allow expert 
testimony regarding child sexual abuse and these cases did not 
require Kelly-Frye. llo The Amber B. court distinguished these 
cases from Bledsoe based on the fact that the evidence was lim-
ited to a discussion of the victims as a class and not as evidence 
of the commission of a crime or the identification of the perpe-
trator.lll The court went on to say that the issue could not be 
avoided in Amber B. because the expert gave a direct opinion 
that Amber had been molested.ll2 At this point, the court 
companying text. 
104. See supra notes 64·67 and accompanying text. 
105. People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 248, 681 P.2d 291, 299, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 
458 (1984). 
106. Id. at 247 n.7, 681 P.2d at 298 n.7, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 457 n.7. 
107. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 30, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148 
(1976). 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 32, 549 P.2d at 1245, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 149. 
110. See cases cited supra note 34. 
111. In re Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d 682, 689·90, 236 Cal. Rptr. 623, 627·28 (1987). 
112; Id. at 689, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 628. 
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equated a determination of abuse in a dependency hearing with 
the identification and commission of a crime in a criminal case. 
They are not the same. A determination of abuse in a depen-
dency hearing results in the child being placed under court pro-
tection,113 while the identification of a perpetrator in a criminal 
trial can subject that person to imprisonment.ll• 
In one of the criminal cases, People v. Roscoe,11II the court 
noted that "[l]ess strict rules of admissibility apply where child 
abuse is an issue in noncriminal cases, such as Welfare and In-
stitutions Code section 300 dependency proceedings. "116 The 
Amber B. court pointed out that Roscoe did not cite any au-
thority and, therefore, it did not survive scrutiny.ll7 In stating 
that Kelly-Frye applied in dependency hearings, the Amber B. 
court's reasoning was short and simple: 1) Welfare and Institu-
tions Code section 355118 requires evidence legally admissible in 
trial of civil cases; 2) Kelly-Frye has been applied in civil tri-
als;1l9 therefore, Kelly-Frye applies in dependency hearings.l2O 
The court's cursory analysis fails to take into consideration that 
statutes and case law have made evidentiary exceptions in de-
pendency hearings and that the Kelly-Frye test has been histor-
ically applied in criminal trials. In fact, the case which the court 
cites to support its argument that Kelly-Frye has been applied 
in civil cases is a paternity suit, more akin to a criminal trial in 
that the purpose is to identify a person responsible for an act. Iii 
113. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text. 
114. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
115. 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1985). 
116. [d. at 1100 n.4, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 50 n.4. 
117. Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d at 689, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 628. 
118. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355 (West Supp. 1988). The statute states: 
[A)ny matter or information relevant and material to the cir-
cumstances or acts which are alleged to bring [the child) 
within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is admissible and 
may be received in evidence. However, proof by a preponder-
ance of evidence, legally admissible in the trial of civil cases 
must be adduced to support a finding that the minor is a per-
son described by § 300. 
Section 701 additionally provides that "[t)he admission and exclusion of evidence shall 
be pursuant to the rules of evidence established by the Evidence Code and by judicial 
decision." (West 1984). 
119. Huntingdon v. Crowley, 64 Cal. 2d 647, 414 P.2d 382, 51 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1966) 
(court held that evidence regarding blood grouping in paternity proceedings must meet 
the Kelly-Frye test to be admissible). 
120. Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d at 689, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 628. 
121. Huntingdon, 64 Cal. 2d. 647, 414 P.2d 382, 51 Cal. Rptr. 254. 
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Despite Roscoe's lack of citing authorities, support can be 
found elsewhere for the idea that the conservative and stricter 
criterion of admissibility required by Kelly-Frye might be neces-
sary in criminal proceedings122 but unwarranted in dependency 
hearings.123 In dependency hearings, the safety and welfare of 
the child is paramount.124 Statutes and judicial decisions have 
recognized this important social policy by creating exceptions in 
the rules of admissibility for dependency hearings. 
The Evidence Code generally prohibits the admission of 
character evidence.1211 In dependency hearings, however, a statu-
tory exception has been created allowing evidence that a parent 
or guardian abused another minor.126 Another exception allows 
the hearsay reports of probation officers.127 In addition, the 
122. See People v. Gray, 187 Cal. App. 3d 213, 231 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1986) in which 
the court held that expert testimony regarding CSAAS did not need to meet the Kelly-
Frye test when offered to rehabilitate the credibility of the claimant witness. The court's 
reasoning for not applying Kelly-Frye in this criminal case was that the evidence was not 
being offered to prove the commission of a crime or identify the perpetrator. Had it 
been, the court would have imposed the test. 
123. See In re E.M., 520 N.Y.S.2d 327 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1987) in which a New York 
court held admissible testimony of an expert regarding child's conduct with anatomical 
dolls to corroborate child's out-of-court statements. [d. at 327. In discussing whether this 
evidence would meet the Frye standard, the court stated that "an overriding point to 
remember [was) that Family Court child protective proceedings were civil, rather than 
criminal, in nature and that it is therefore appropriate to err on the side of admissibil-
ity ... when it comes to the introduction of evidence derived from new clinical testing 
techniques .... " [d. at 332. 
124. See In re Mary S., 186 Cal. App. 3d 414, 230 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1986) (in depen-. 
dency hearings evidence code should be interpreted in light of paramount purpose to 
protect welfare of the child); Collins v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. App. 3d 47, 141 Cal. Rptr. 
273 (1977) (purpose to protect and promote welfare of child); In re Raya, 255 Cal. App. 
2d 260, 63 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1967) (welfare of child paramount concern); People v. Fifield, 
136 Cal. App. 2d 741, 289 P.2d 303 (1955) (juvenile proceedings are not criminal trials 
but in nature of guardian proceedings). See also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE section 300 
(West Supp. 1988) (operative Jan. 1, 1988 & operative Jan. 1, 1990) (the intent of the 
Legislature in enacting section 300 is to provide maximum protection for children who 
are sexually abused. 
125. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101 (West Supp. 1988) ("evidence of a person's charac-
ter .. .is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion.") 
126. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355.l(b) (West Supp. 1988); see In re Dorothy I., 
162 Cal. App. 3d 1154, 209 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1984) (in a dependency hearing, psychiatrist 
permitted to testify that there was substantial danger posed to the child as result of 
abusive conduct of the father toward minor's sibling, regardless of Evidence Code section 
1101, which prohibits character evidence); In re Marianne R., 113 Cal. App. 3d 423, 169 
Cal. Rptr. 848 (1980) (in a proceeding to maintain placement of the child in foster care, 
evidence concerning the father's prior sexual conduct with his stepdaughter held admis-
sible, regardless of the admissibility of this evidence in a criminal trial). 
127. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 281 (West 1984). 
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fourth amendment exclusionary rule relating to unlawfully 
seized evidence has been determined to be inapplicable in de-
pendency hearings because of the potential harm to children in 
allowing them to remain in an unhealthy environment.128 Fur-
thermore, the sixth amendment right to confront the witness is 
not considered absolute in civil cases and in particular, depen-
dency hearings. Because the child's welfare is paramount, con-
frontation of the minor witness by the parent's counsel may be 
done in the judge's chambers, outside the presence of the par-
ents.129 The legislature has also created a legal presumption that 
certain children come within the jurisdiction of Welfare and In-
stitutions Code section 300.lS0 This presumption establishes a 
prima facie case for dependency when the court finds, upon 
competent professional evidence, that an injury or detrimental 
condition exists, that is of such a nature as would not be ordina-
rily sustained except through abuse. lsl 
Another difference between dependency hearings and other 
civil proceedings and criminal trials is that dependency hearings, 
as a function of the court's equitable jurisdiction, are not heard 
in the presence of a jury. The Amber B. court states that the 
underlying purpose of the Kelly-Frye test is to prevent the 
factfinder from being misled by the "aura of infallibility" that 
may surround unproven scientific methods. ls2 This may be nec-
essary in a criminal or civil proceeding when the factfinder IS 
128. In re Christopher B., 82 Cal. App. 3d 608, 147 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1978). 
129. Seering v. Department of Social Serv., 194 Cal. App. 3d 298, 239 Cal. Rptr. 422 
(1987) (in administrative hearing regarding suspension of day care license, victim allowed 
to testify in chambers because of trauma and fear of testifying in front of alleged perpe-
trator, held not to violate statutory and due process rights to confront witness); In re 
Mary S., 186 Cal. App. 3d 414, 419, 230 Cal. Rptr. 726, 729 (1986) (father's right to 
confrontation adequately protected by counsel's cross examination in chambers, outside 
presence of father); See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 350(b) (West Supp. 1988) (testimony 
of the child may be taken in chambers, outside the presence of the parents if the court 
determines it is necessary to ensure truthfulness, if the minor is intimidated by the court 
setting, or the child is afraid to testify in front of the parents). 
130. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355.1(a) (West Supp. 1988). The presumption is one 
affecting the burden of proof, not a presumption affecting the production of evidence. [d. 
at § 355.1(c). This statute replaced an earlier statute which one court interpreted as only 
affecting the production of evidence. See In re James B., 166 Cal. App. 3d 934, 212 Cal. 
Rptr. 778 (1985) (presumption only survived until the parents presented rebuttal 
evidence). 
131. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355.1(a) (West Supp. 1988). The statute also states 
that testimony by a parent in a section 300 proceeding is inadmissible as evidence in 
other actions. [d. at § 355.l(d). 
132. In re Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d 682, 690, 236 Cal. Rptr. 623, 629 (1987). 
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typically a jury. With a jury, there may be a greater possibility 
of abuse relative to the weight of evidence than there would be if 
a judge were the trier of fact.133 But, in dependency hearings, 
the factfinder is always a judgelS' who, through his or her experi-
ence of hearing numerous expert witnesses, would tend to be less 
impressed with the opinion of the expert than a lay juror. The 
Kelly-Frye test removes the question of the evidence's reliability 
from the discretion of the judge.131i 
The Kelly-Frye standard of admissibility has been criticized 
by commentators for preventing the admission of relevant evi-
dence.136 The critics state that the goals of the test, such as pro-
viding uniformity and shielding the factfinder from the tendency 
to treat the evidence as infallible, can be obtained through other 
alternatives.137 Some jurisdictions have modified the test by 
adopting a substantial acceptance test rather than the general 
acceptance test.138 Others allow evidence regarding the general 
acceptance for purposes of determining the weight of the evi-
dence but not for the purpose of exclusion.13s Several jurisdic-
tions have rejected the test completely and rely on traditional 
133. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 60 (3d ed. 1984) (UUudges'J profes-
sional experience in valuing evidence greatly lessens the need for exclusionary rules.") 
134. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (no federal constitutional right 
to jury trial in juvenile court cases). 
135. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text. 
136. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 30-31, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 
148 (1976); Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d at 690 n.4, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 629 n.4; see MCCOR-
MICK, supra note 133 at §§ 203-06; Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evi-
dence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980) 
(article details the lengthy and controversial history of the Frye test and the author 
accepts the premise of Frye, at least in criminal cases, but rejects the standard as 
unworkable). 
137. See, MCCORMICK, supra note 133, at § 203 at 608 (author states that the Frye 
standard should be substituted with a substantial acceptance test which would allow any 
relevant conclusions supported by qualified expert witness to be admitted unless there 
are distinct reasons for exclusion, such as unfair prejudice); Giannelli supra note 136, at 
1248 (author advocates a procedure in which the proponent would be required to estab-
lish the validity of a novel scientific technique beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal 
trials and by a preponderance of the evidence in a civil trial). 
138. MCCORMICK, supra note 133, at § 203 at 606. 
139. [d. See People v. Marx, 54 Cal. App. 3d 100, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1975). The 
court agreed generally with the purpose of the Kelly-Frye standard, but in holding that 
the trial court did not err in not applying the standard, the court stated, U[wJe do not 
believe that under all the circumstances of this case the standard of 'general acceptance 
by recognized experts in the field' is determinative of the admissibility-as distinguished 
from weight-of the evidence in this case." [d. at 109-10, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 355. 
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standards of relevance and expertise. 140 
Cheryl H. recognized the need to protect the child and per-
mitted expert testimony to address the issue of whether the 
child had been abused and needed court protection.141 The court 
did not allow this evidence to prove the commission of a crime 
or to identify the actual perpetrator.142 By limiting the evidence 
solely to the determination of whether the child was in danger 
and in need of protection, the judicial restraint of Kelly was not 
required. Under Cheryl H., the judge had adequate safeguards 
to limit or exclude the evidence if necessary. The evidence could 
be excluded if irrelevant,143 or if the probative value was sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or confu-
sion of the issues. 144 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As the Amber B. court states, it is particularly difficult to 
determine at what point evidence of psychological analysis of 
behavior transcends expert testimony and becomes scientific evi-
dence. To this elusive question, the court offers little clarifica-
tion. It imposes a test based on how likely the factfinder is to be 
awed by the evidence. Had the court defined scientific process 
based on the nature of the evidence, it is doubtful that the use 
of anatomical dolls or the analysis of the child's report of abuse 
would be considered scientific processes requiring Kelly-Frye. 
The dolls are a tool to facilitate a meaningful exchange between 
the therapist and child, and they aid the therapist in forming his 
or her opinion as to whether the child has been abused. They are 
not a scientific process whereby data is inserted and quantifiable 
results emerge. 
140. MCCORMICK, supra note 133 at § 203 at 607. See Giannelli supra note 136. The 
author states that the current status of the Frye test is difficult to assess and the adop-
tion of Federal Rules of Evidence, although adopted by twenty-two jurisdictions adds no 
clarity, because the Rules, the Advisory Committee's Notes and legislative history are 
silent on whether the Rules supersede or incorporate the Frye standard. [d. at 122S-30. 
The author further reports that jurisdictions are split but that it is likely that more 
courts will reject the Frye standard in favor of alternative approaches. [d. at 1231. 
141. In re Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d 109S, 1116-1S, 200 Cal. Rptr. 7S9, SOO-Ol 
(1984). 
142. [d. at IllS, 200 Cal. Rptr. at SOL 
143. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 350-351 (West 1966). 
144. CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1966). 
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In dependency hearings, the ultimate goal is the welfare and 
safety of the child. The social policy of preventing continued 
and future harm to the child demands that all relevant evidence 
be presented and that the judge be given a wide latitude of dis-
cretion in determining what evidence is admissible. The addi-
tional requirement of reliability as imposed by the Kelly-Frye 
standard may be necessary in criminal cases before juries, but is 
unwarranted in dependency hearings. The previous safeguards 
of Cheryl H.146 prevented the evidence from being used to iden-
tify the perpetrator, but allowed the evidence to determine 
whether an abuse had occurred for the limited purpose of deter-
mining whether the child was in danger. Unfortunately, the Am-
ber B. court has chosen to erect yet another barrier in the al-
ready difficult task of protecting sexually abused children. 
Matthew J. Dulka* 
145. Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 200 Cal. Rptr. 789. 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, class of 1989. 
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